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I.

INTRODUCTION

Minnesota adopted Minnesota Statute section 169.122, the
"Open Bottle Law," in 1959.1 Since that time, there has been some

t J.D. Candidate 2002, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A., St. Cloud
State University.
1. MINN. STAT. § 169.122 (1998 & Supp. 1999); State v. Loge, 608 N.W.2d
152, 154 (Minn. 2000). Since the Loge decision, the legislature has amended section 169.122. The amended form of section 169.122 had no affect on the Court's
analysis. Infra note 18 and accompanying text. At the time of the Loge decision,
section 169.122 read as follows:
Subdivision 1. Act prohibited. No person shall drink or consume intoxicating liquors or nonintoxicating malt liquors in any motor vehicle when
such vehicle is upon a public highway.
Subdivision 2. Possession prohibited. No person shall have in possession
while in a private motor vehicle upon a public highway, any bottle or receptacle containing intoxicating liquor or 3.2 percent malt liquor which
has been opened, or the seal broken, or the contents of which have been
partially removed. For purposes of this section, "possession" means either that the person had actual possession of the bottle or receptacle or
that the person consciously exercised dominion and control over the bot1287
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question as to whether subdivision 3 of the statute established that
the owner, or driver of the vehicle if the owner is not present, must
have knowledge of an open bottle to be convicted under the law.
In March of 2000, the Minnesota Supreme Court finally addressed
this issue in State v. Loge. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed
a Minnesota Court of Appeal's holding that section 169.122, subdivision 3, makes a driver of a vehicle liable for unknowingly keeping
an open bottle of intoxicating liquor in the vehicle while driving on
a public highway.3 In ruling on this issue, the Minnesota Supreme
Court correctly interpreted section 169.122 as creating a strict liability offense for an owner or driver who violates the Open Bottle
Law.
II. HISTORY

A.

GeneralHistory

Legislatures generally began enacting Open Bottle Laws "in an
effort to promote highway safety by decreasing the opportunity for
that an open container
alcohol consumption and drunken driving ,,4
Allowing a driver to
creates.
vehicle
in
the
anywhere
alcohol
of
tleor receptacle. This subdivision does not apply to a bottle or receptacle that is in the trunk of the vehicle if it is equipped with a trunk, or that
is in another area of the vehicle not normally occupied by the driver and
passengers if the vehicle is not equipped with a trunk.
Subdivision 3. Liability of nonpresent owner. It shall be unlawful for the
owner of any private motor vehicle or the driver, if the owner be not then
present in the motor vehicle, to keep or allow to be kept in a motor vehicle when such vehicle is upon the public highway any bottle or receptacle
containing intoxicating liquors or 3.2 percent malt liquors which has
been opened, or the seal broken, or the contents of which have been
partially removed except when such bottle or receptacle shall be kept in
the trunk of the motor vehicle when such vehicle is equipped with a
trunk, or kept in some other area of the vehicle not normally occupied
by the driver or passengers, if the motor vehicle is not equipped with a
trunk. A utility compartment or glove compartment shall be deemed to
be within the area occupied by the driver and passengers.
Subdivision 4. Whoever violates the provisions of subdivisions 1 to 3 is
guilty of a misdemeanor.
Subdivision 5. Exceptions. This section does not apply to the possession
or consumption of alcoholic beverage by passengers in: (1) a bus that is
operated by a motor carrier of passengers, as defined in section 221.011,
subdivision 48; or (2) a vehicle providing limousine service as defined in
section 221.84, subdivision 1.
MINN. STAT. § 169.122.
2. Loge, 608 N.W.2d at 153.
3. Id. at 158-159.
4. Id. at 156.
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consume alcohol in a vehicle gives that individual an opportunity
to become intoxicated while driving.5 As an individual's blood alcohol concentration increases so does their probability of being involved in an accident.6 Specifically, the "most dangerous form of
alcohol consumption from the viewpoint of drunk driving is that
which occurs in cars."7 For example, a study involving San Diego
drivers who had been arrested for drinking and driving found that
more than half had consumed alcohol in their cars soon after purchasing it from the store." As a result, several laws have been passed
through the legislature, such as the Open Bottle Law, which seek to
reduce and prosecute drunk driving offenders. 9 However, not all
5. 2 MARTIN J. COSTELLO ET AL., MINNESOTA MISDEMEANORS AND MOVING
TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS 221 (3rd ed. 1999).
6. DONALD H. NICHOLS ET AL., THE DRINKING DRIVER IN MINNESOTA: CRIMINAL
AND CIVIL ISSUES, 2 (1982). "The higher a driver's blood alcohol concentration,
the disproportionately greater is the likelihood that he will crash, the greater is the
likelihood that he himself will have initiated any crash in which he is involved, and
the greater is the likelihood that the crash will have been severe." Id. The author
also states that "[r]oughly half of all traffic deaths in the United States involve
heavy use of alcohol on the part of drivers or pedestrians." Id. at 1. Similarly,
"[d] rivers identified by police as having been drinking (but not necessarily legally
drunk) are at least eight times more likely to cause a fatal crash than are drivers
with no reported alcohol involvement." STEVEN D. LEVITr &JACK PORTER, ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF ALCOHOL ON DRIVER RISK USING ONLY FATAL ACCIDEN" STATISTICS 4 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6944, 1999).

"Drivers above the blood-alcohol limit of 0.10 are at least 14 times more likely to
be the cause of fatal crashes." Id.
7. HUGH LAURENCE Ross, CONFRONTING DRUNK DRIVING: SOCIAL POLICY FOR
SAVING LIVES 99 (1992); see also LEvIrr & PORTER, supra note 6, at 1 (stating that
the "death toll in motor vehicle accidents roughly equals the combined number of
suicides and homicides, and motor vehicle deaths are thirty times as frequent as
accidental deaths due to firearms."); ChristinaJ. Nielsen, The Foreclosure Of Double
Jeopardy In Administrative License Suspension And Civil Asset ForfeituresFollowing United
States v. Ursery, 65 U.M.KC. L. REV. 104, 122 (1996) (stating that that the problem
of driving while intoxicated is so wide spread that approximately 1.6 million drivers are arrested each year for driving under the influence of alcohol or narcotics
and two in five Americans will find themselves in an alcohol-related crash at some
point in their lives); Sean P. Sweeney, Murphy's Law: Be Mindful Of 'Social Host Liability'DuringHolidays, THE PATRIOT LEDGER, Dec. 11, 1999, at 4F (stating that "in
the past decade, four times as many Americans have died in drunk driving accidents as were killed in the Vietnam War"). Mr. Sweeney also notes that, in 1997
alone, there were two alcohol-related traffic deaths per hour. Id. "This rate of
death is the equivalent of twojetliners crashing every week." Id.
8. ROSS, supranote 7, at 99.
9. NICHOLS, supra note 6, at 3. The forms of criminal charges for drunk driving violations range from driving while under the influence (DWI), to aggravated
DWI (for a person who has had a previous offense), to criminal negligence (where
a death has occurred). Id. In addition to regulations such as the Open Bottle
Law, many municipalities have passed local ordinances to prohibit alcohol con-
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states prohibit the consumption of alcohol while driving.1 ° Federal
Law now provides highway traffic incentive grants for states that
adopt open-bottle and in-vehicle consumption laws."
B. Minnesota History
Minnesota adopted the Open Bottle Law, section 169.122, in
1959. 12 Section 169.122 was amended in 1986 13, 1990 14 , 1991 15
199316, 199417, and 1999.18 The statute, like other sections of the
sumption and possession in private parking lots or public areas in an effort to control the disorderly conduct associated with drinking near vehicles in parks.
COSTELLO, supra note 5, at 223.
10. COSTELLO, supra note

5, at 221; see alsoJennifer E. Dayok, Administrative
Driver'sLicense Suspension: A Remedial Tool That Is Not In Jeopardy, 45 AM. U. L. REV.
1151, 1184 n.9 (1996) (stating that at least twenty-five states have open container
laws).
11. COSTELLO, supra note 5, at 221.
12. MINN. STAT. § 169.122 (1998 & Supp. 1999).
13. Id. (removing gender specific references applicable to human beings
throughout Minnesota Statutes). These amendments did not change the substance of the amended statutes. Id.
14. Id. (defining possession in subdivision 2 and providing "that the subdivision does not apply to bottles or receptacles in trunks or other areas of vehicles
not normally occupied by drivers and passengers").
15. Id. (substituting "3.2 percent malt liquor" for "nonintoxicating malt liquor").
16. Id. (adding subdivision 5, which created an exception to this statute in the
case of a "limousine or a bus operated under a charter").
17. Id. (replacing "a limousine as defined in section 168.011, subdivision 35"
with "a vehicle providing limousine service as defined in section 221.84, subdivision 1").
18. Currently, section 169.122, as amended, reads as follows:
Subdivision 1. Act prohibited. No person shall drink or consume an alcoholic beverage, distilled spirit, or 3.2 percent malt liquor in any motor
vehicle when the vehicle is upon a public highway.
Subdivision 2. Possession prohibited. (a) No person shall have in possession while in a private motor vehicle upon a public highway, any bottle or
receptacle containing an alcoholic beverage, distilled spirit, or 3.2 percent malt liquor that has been opened, or the seal broken, or the contents of which have been partially removed. (b) For purposes of this section, "possession" means either that the person had actual possession of
the bottle or receptacle or that the person consciously exercised dominion and control over the bottle or receptacle. This subdivision does not
apply to a bottle or receptacle that is in the trunk of the vehicle if it is
equipped with a trunk, or that is in another area of the vehicle not normally occupied by the driver and passengers if the vehicle is not
equipped with a trunk.
Subdivision 3. Liability of nonpresent owner. (a) It is unlawful for the
owner of any private motor vehicle or the driver, if the owner is not then
present in the motor vehicle, to keep or allow to be kept in a motor vehi-
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same chapter, is designed to regulate and promote highway safety. 9
Section 169.122 prohibits both the consumption of liquor or beer
and the possession of open bottles or other receptacles containing
those substances by persons in motor vehicles on public highways. 21 Violation of this statute is a misdemeanor. 22 This section
cle when the vehicle is upon the public highway any bottle or receptacle
containing an alcoholic beverage, distilled spirit, or 3.2 percent malt liquor that has been opened, or the seal broken, or the contents of which
have been partially removed. (b) This subdivision does not apply to a
bottle or receptacle that is in the trunk of the motor vehicle when the
vehicle is equipped with a trunk, or that is in some other area of the vehicle not normally occupied by the driver or passengers if the motor vehicle is not equipped with a trunk. (c) A utility compartment or glove
compartment is deemed to be within the area occupied by the driver and
passengers.
Subdivision 4. Whoever violates the provisions of subdivisions 1 to 3 is
guilty of a misdemeanor.
Subdivision 5. Exceptions. This section does not apply to the possession
or consumption of alcoholic beverages by passengers in: (1) a bus that is
operated by a motor carrier of passengers, as defined in section 221.011,
subdivision 48; or (2) a vehicle providing limousine service as defined in
section 221.84, subdivision 1.
Id.
19. State v. Loge, 589 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). Section
169.122 is located next to other Minnesota laws dealing with alcohol and driving.
E.g., MINN. STAT. § 169.121 (1999) (addressing DWIs); MINN. STAT. § 169.123
(1999) (stating that any person who drives, operates, or is in physical control of a
motor vehicle consents to a chemical test for intoxication); see also Abeln v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 413 N.W.2d 546, 547-548 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (stating
that the physical control requirement of section 169.123 subd. 2 is designed to deter intoxicated individuals from entering their vehicles, except as passengers).
20. MINN. STAT. § 169.01, subd. 3 (1998 & Supp. 1999) (defining "motor vehicle" as "every vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle which is propelled
by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires," but not including a vehicle moved solely by human power).
21. MINN. STAT. § 169.122 (1998 & Supp. 1999); see also State v. Tungland, 281
N.W.2d 646, 649 (Minn. 1979) (holding that it is not a violation of Minnesota Statute 169.122 for a person to keep an open bottle in a car on private land); Sept.Dec. 1961 Minn. Op. Att'y Gen. 218h-2 (Nov. 8, 1961) (stating that an unopened
beer can taken from a six-pack would not constitute a violation under section
169.122). The opinion, issued by Attorney General Walter F. Mondale and Assistant Attorney General Henry H. Feikema, was in response to a situation where a
motorist was apprehended for a traffic offense and was in possession of an unopened can of 3.2 beer. Id. The opinion stated the following:
It is the opinion of this office that it was the intention of the legislature in
adding subd. 3 to c. 255 to give strength to subd. 1 which prohibits the
consumption of intoxicating liquors or non-intoxicating malt liquors
while such motor vehicles are on public highways. The act in its enabling
clause reads "...prohibiting the carrying of open bottles or receptacles in motor vehicles...." It is apparent, therefore, that it is the open can of beer
itself, rather than the opened package or carton in which the beer is sold,
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does not require that the driver consumes any alcohol or that he or
23
she is intoxicated. Not only can this statute be enforced on public
highways, but Minnesota's Open Bottle Law may also be enforced
against tribal members on Indian reservations.24
Most of the historical controversy that has surrounded section
169.122 dealt with the reasonableness of searches involving open
containers. Once the police lawfully stop a vehicle and observe an
open bottle in plain view, they have the right to search any other
part of the vehicle where keeping an open bottle would be a violation of the statute. 25 An officer may continue searching a vehicle
that is sought to be reached. The fact that the package or carton has
been broken does not lend the intoxicating liquor or non-intoxicating
malt beverage readily consumable. Thus, it is our opinion that the legislature did not create a distinction between purchasing beer or other such
items by the carton or case as opposed to its purchase by the single bottle
or can.
Id.
22.
23.
STAT.

MINN. STAT. § 169.122, subd. 4.
State v. Collard, 414 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (citing MINN.

§ 169.122, subd. 3).

24. State v. Robinson, 572 N.W.2d 720, 722-724 (Minn. 1997) (holding the
prohibition against underage consumption of alcohol is designed to protect minors and the public and applying this analysis to the Open Bottle Law would result
in the same conclusion: the law is designed to protect the driver, passenger, and
the public and, therefore, it is enforceable on the Indian reservation).
25. State v. Ellanson, 198 N.W.2d 136, 137 (Minn. 1972) (holding that an officer who observed a vehicle being driven erratically by the defendant had a right to
stop the defendant and then arrest the individual for a violation of section 169.122
when an open bottle was observed in plain sight on the floor of the back seat; also
holding that the officer then had a right to search any part of the vehicle where
keeping an open bottle would constitute a violation, the fact that the officer found
marijuana and not an open bottle did not affect the reasonableness aspect of the
search). There is a vehicle or automobile exception to the search warrant requirement. 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 84 (1995); see also State v. DeWald, 463
N.W.2d 741, 748 (Minn. 1990) (holding that it was constitutionally permissible for
officers to search a vehicle without a warrant because they had probable cause to
believe that the vehicle contained evidence of a crime). Once there is probable
cause for a search, a warrantless search may be conducted on a vehicle under the
general motor vehicle exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Armstrong,
291 N.W.2d 918, 918-919 (Minn. 1980) (holding that the search of the defendant's
car was justified by the motor vehicle exception to the warrant requirement when
the defendant was arrested for the petty misdemeanor of possessing a small
amount of marijuana); see also State v. Johnson, 277 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn.
1979) (holding that an officer's seizure of a paper bag found in the trunk of the
defendant's vehicle was a lawful part of a search incident to the defendant's arrest
after the officer observed marijuana plants in plain view in the open trunk of the
defendant's vehicle); State v. Schultz, 271 N.W.2d 836, 837 (Minn. 1978) (holding
that an officer who smelled the scent of marijuana coming from the defendant's
vehicle properly conducted a warrantless search of the passenger compartment for
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marijuana pursuant to the motor vehicle exception to the warrant requirement).
The justification for a search often stems from a plain-view sighting of an item that
suggests criminal activity.

DONALD H. NICHOLS, THE DRINKING DRIVER IN MINNE-

§ 4.06, at 63-5 (2ded. 1999); see, e.g., State v. Schuette, 423 N.W.2d 104, 106
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that after a vehicle had been lawfully stopped,
which led to the defendant failing a field sobriety test, an officer who observed in
open view an empty bottle on the floor of the vehicle and a six-pack containing
one empty and one full beer bottle between the two front seats had probable cause
to search the car, including a rolled up grocery bag next to the six-pack, for additional bottles, even though the officer had already obtained the open bottles necessary to charge the driver with an open-bottle violation); Collard, 414 N.W.2d at
735-736 (holding that an officer who witnessed an open beer bottle standing upright in the defendant's vehicle had a valid reason to seize the bottle as evidence
of a violation of section 169.122, and that the police officer who observed the violation of section 169.122 had probable cause for a warrantless search of the remainder of the passenger compartment); State v. Krech, 381 N.W.2d 898, 899
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the officers' observance of the defendant sitting behind the wheel of parked car holding a can of beer gave them probable
cause to believe the defendant had violated section 169.122); State v. Pierce, 347
N.W.2d 829, 833 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the search of a car driven by
the defendant, which was originally stopped for a noisy muffler, was proper after
the officer recognized that the defendant was on probation and was not being allowed to drink or possess beer, recognized the scent of alcohol coming from the
car as the defendant got out of the vehicle, and observed an open case of beer in
the car with cans missing and a metal can tab on the floor; also holding that once
the officer was properly inside the defendant's car searching for open bottles, the
officer had the right to search the glove compartment because it is a prohibited
place to store alcohol under section 169.122 and also because this area is a natural
place to hide alcohol). Generally, an officer who is in a place where he has a ight
to be may look into a vehicle which has been lawfully stopped, and may bend
down at an angle or use a flashlight while looking in the vehicle. 79 C.J.S. Searches
and Seizures § 81 (1955); e.g., State v. McKenzie, 392 N.W.2d 345, 347 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986) (stating that an officer may use a flashlight to illuminate the interior of
a vehicle that has been properly stopped). A person traveling in an automobile on
public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements
from one place to another. Id. Once there has been a proper stop, a plain-view
sighting gives the officer the right to undertake a complete search of the vehicle
pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Vohnoutka, 292 N.W.2d 756, 757 (Minn. 1980). Once an officer has the right to
search a vehicle, the officer may also search closed containers if there is probable
cause to believe that the containers could hold the substance suspected.
COSTELLO, supra note 5, at 225; see also State v. Nace, 404 N.W.2d 357, 361 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a warrantless search of a container inside a vehicle is
permissible if the container could reasonably hold the substance suspected); State
v. Cameron, No. C8-96-2111, 1997 WL 206811, at *1-2 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 29,
1997) (unpublished) (holding that it was not permissible for an officer to search a
small plastic bowl because the object could not reasonably be concluded to hold
alcohol). However, an inventory search of the defendant's vehicle is justified only
in the case where impoundment is necessary and only after the state's interest in
impounding is found to outweigh the individual's fourth amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Goodrich, 256 N.W.2d 506,
510 (Minn. 1977). Similarly,
SOTA,
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after an open container has been found because this gives the offi-6
exist.
cer probable cause to believe additional violations may
Once an officer undertakes a search for open containers, the defendant may be charged with any other types of violations that are
discovered. However, a passenger's mere presence in a vehicle in
which another possesses an open container does not present probable cause to search the passenger.28
Approximately one year after the statute was enacted, the
[w]arrantless searches of luggage or other property seized at the time of
an arrest, whether taken from the inside or the outside of an automobile,
are impermissible once the property is physically disassociated from the
defendant and there is no danger that the defendant could gain access to
dangerous or otherwise disposable objects contained within the suitcase
or other property.
NICHOLS, supranote 25, at 64.

In Minnesota, the right to search an individual stopped for a traffic offense is
more limited. Id. at 63-2 (citation omitted). Under these limitations, a driver
cannot be searched "unless it is demonstrated that (a) he is habitually armed, (b)
he has a prior record of assaultive behavior, (c) he has assumed a hostile or
threatening attitude, or (d) after the stop, a cursory examination gives the peace
officer reasonable grounds to believe the person is engaged in a more serious
crime." Id. at 62-3 to 63-2 (citing State v. Curtis, 190 N.W.2d 631, 636 (Minn.
1971)); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (holding that an officer may
conduct a pat-down or frisk search if there is reason to believe the individual he is
dealing with may be armed).
26. Schuette, 423 N.W.2d at 106.
27. Ellanson, 198 N.W.2d at 137; see also United States v. Parham, 458 F.2d
438, 439 (8th Cir. 1972) (holding (1) that officers who saw a car driving slowly
down a road with a beer can on its roof were justified in stopping the car to question the driver and passengers with respect to a possible violation of section
169.122, and (2) that the officers who observed the defendant hiding something
in the back seat had probable cause to believe the defendant was in violation of
section 169.122 and, therefore, it was not unreasonable to conduct a limited
search under the clothing for an open bottle that, instead, revealed a sawed-off
shotgun); State v. Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d 105, 109 (Minn. 1983) (holding that an
officer, after detecting the odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle, had the right
to search all areas of the passenger compartment where open bottles or cans
might be found and that marijuana found during that search that was in plain view
was properly discovered; however, the court also held that the officer was not entitled to search the trunk for open bottles or receptacles because it is not illegal to
keep open bottles or receptacles in the trunk); State v. Veigel, 304 N.W.2d 900,
901 (Minn. 1981) (holding that the officer's view of an open beer bottle in the car
led to the lawful search of the passenger compartment that disclosed a balance
beam scale, a roach clip, and a pipe).
28. State v. Eggersgluess, 483 N.W.2d 94, 97 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); see also
State v. Slifka, 256 N.W.2d 90, 91 (Minn. 1977) (holding that an officer who
stopped a vehicle for an equipment violation had probable cause to arrest and
search the driver for violation of section 169.122 and could reasonably search the
glove compartment, which yielded marijuana, but the officer did not have probable cause to arrest the passenger of the vehicle).
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Minnesota Attorney General issued an opinion stating that "the
language of the statute does not require that the alleged violator
should have had knowledge that there was in the automobile of
whichintoxcatin
he was.. the driver,
,,29 an opened bottle or receptacle containing
intoxicating liquors.
This began a debate over the inclusion of
the knowledge element in subdivision 3.' 0 Subdivision 3 creates
open bottle criminal liability for the owner of a motor vehicle, or
the driver if the owner is not Present, that is substantially more
broad than for the passengers. This debate is further illustrated
by a comment in the Minnesota Jury Instructions.
The instructions include an optional portion in brackets which reads, "[This
means
h., ,,,33that defendant knew the (bottle) (receptacle) was in the vehicle] .
In spite of the debate, since the statute's enactment in
1959, subdivision 3 has not had any substantive changes.3 The
Minnesota Supreme Court has only reviewed the statute regarding

29. Jan.-Mar. 1960 Minn. Op. Att'y Gen. 989a-25 (1960). The opinion, issued
by Attorney General Miles Lord and Special Assistant Attorney General Henry H.
Feikema, was in response to the following scenario:
At approximately 3:00 o'clock A.M., a 20 year old minor, driving a motor
vehicle owned by his father, had stopped at a semaphore signal, being
still in operation, and which was located at an intersection of several state
and U.S. highways within the limits of the City of Benson, Minnesota. A
Benson City police officer, on his regular patrol noticed the vehicle
stopped in its proper lane and at the proper point at the controlled intersection. However, the vehicle remained in such stopped position
through several changes of the lights of the semaphore. Upon investigation, the officer found the 20 year old driver asleep in the driver's seat of
the vehicle and the motor was running. The officer further discovered a
bottle of liquor (whiskey) in the rear seat of the vehicle, the seal of which
had been broken, and which had been opened and the contents of which
had been partially removed. The said bottle had been covered with an
article of clothing. Investigation has shown the driver borrowed the vehicle to take a friend home, that his parents had placed the bottle in the
vehicle and that the 20 year old driver was the sole occupant of the vehicle at the time the officer investigated the vehicle and that said driver had
absolutely no knowledge of the presence of the 'open bottle' within the
vehicle.
Id.
30. MINN. STAT. § 169.122, subd. 3 (1998 & Supp. 1999).
31. Id.
32. 10a Minn. Dist. Judges Ass'n, MinnesotaPractice-JuryInstruction Guides, Misdemeanor and Gross Misdemeanor, M-JIG 3.17 Comment (1989 ed.).
33. Id. The comment noted that trial judges were divided as to whether
knowledge was an element of the statute. Id. The comment stated that the question of knowledge had not been ruled on and the trial judge could include the
knowledge element at his or her own discretion. Id.
34. State v. Loge, 608 N.W.2d 152, 154 (Minn. 2000).
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the aforementioned search and seizure issues.35
III. THE LOGE DECISION
A.

The Facts

On September 2, 1997, Steven Mark Loge borrowed his father's pick-up truck. 6 On his way home from work, two Albert Lea
police officers stopped Loge for speeding.17 While one officer was
talking to Loge, the other officer observed a bottle of beer, which
was open and had foam on the inside, in a brown paper bag underneath the front passenger seat.' s The officer searched the rest
of the truck and found one full, unopened can of beer and one
empty beer can. 9 The first officer asked Loge if he had been drinking and Loge stated that he had two beers while working.4 Loge
was charged with keeping an open bottle containing intoxicating
liquor in an automobile in violation of Minnesota Statute section
169.122, subdivision 3.4.
At trial on January 29, 1998, Loge testified that the open bottle
did not belong to him and he did not know it was in the car.42 The
trial court requested memoranda from the city attorney and Loge's
counsel on the question of whether knowledge was an element of

Minnesota
concluded
trial court
and found

Statute section 169.122, subdivision 3.41 Both parties
that knowledge was a required element. 44 However, the
concluded that subdivision 3 created absolute liability
Loge guilty. 4' Loge appealed the verdict. 6 The court of

35. Id. at 155.
36. Id. at 153.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. Loge passed all field sobriety tests. Id.
41. Id.; MINN. STAT. §169.122, subd. 3 (1998 & Supp. 1999). No probable
cause challenge was raised to either the stop or the officer's actions in discovering
the open bottle under the passenger seat. Loge, 608 N.W.2d at 153. Loge was also
cited for having no proof of insurance, although this charge was later dismissed.
Id.
42. Loge, 589 N.W.2d at 492. Loge testified that the car he was driving when
the officers stopped him belonged to his father. Id. Loge also testified that others
had driven the car during the two weeks he had borrowed it from his father. Id.
43. Id. at 153; MINN. STAT. §169.122, subd. 3 (1998 & Supp. 1999).
44. Loge, 608 N.W.2d at 153.
45. Id. (holding that subdivision 3 creates "'absolute liability' on a
driver/owner to 'inspect and determine.. .whether there are any containers' in the
motor vehicle in violation of the open bottle law..."). At the bench trial, Loge was
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appeals affirmed, holding that proof of knowledge of the open bottle was not required to sustain a conviction.4 7 The Minnesota Su48
preme Court granted Loge's petition for further review.
B.

The Court's Analysis

The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court.49
The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed Minnesota Statute section
169.122, subdivision 3, as it related to a vehicle having a sole occupant. 0 The majority noted that their decision does not address the

interpretation of the statute when two or more individuals are present in a vehicle." Specifically, the majority stated that a situation
with a single individual in the vehicle requires only the interpretation of the phrase "'keep[s]'...any open bottle containing intoxi-

sentenced to five days in jail, execution stayed, placed on probation for one year,
and fined $150 plus costs of $32.50. Id. at 153-54.
46. Id. at 154. The city attorney did not file a respondent's brief, but instead
sent a letter to the Clerk of Appellate Court stating that he concurred with the
Appellant's brief. Id.
47. Id. On appeal, Loge also raised the question of whether enforcement of
section 169.122 without a knowledge requirement violated the due process clause
by imposing strict criminal liability for a common omission. Loge, 589 N.W.2d at
492. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the exercise of police power is limited by due process. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957). However,
the knowledge requirement is not mandated and states are allowed to create strict
liability for a number of criminal offenses. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150
(1959). In Loge, the defendant failed to make the constitutional challenge at trial
court and, therefore, both the appellate court and the Minnesota Supreme Court
properly declined to address the issue. Loge, 608 N.W.2d at 154; Loge, 589 N.W.2d
at 493; see also Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating a reviewing court generally will not consider issues not raised in the lower court). The
question of the constitutionality of a statute must be raised at trial court; the constitutionality of a statute cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. State v.
Engholm, 290 N.W.2d 780, 784 (Minn. 1980).
48. Loge, 608 N.W.2d at 154. The Attorney General then assumed the case
and filed a respondent's brief, contrary to the state's position, stating that knowledge is not a requirement under subdivision 3. Id.
49. Id. at 159.
50. Id. at 156.
51. Id. at 155. The majority noted that a situation with more than one individual would require the interpretation of the phrase "allows to be kept," which
the court declined to address. Id. at n.3. The court explained that since the statute presented two alternate concepts separated by "or," the language made a
distinction between two factual situations. Id. The court stated that, "We have
long held that in the absence of some ambiguity surrounding the legislature's use
of the word "or," we will read it in the disjunctive and require that only one of the
possible factual situations be present in order for the statute to be satisfied.
Accordingly, we limit our opinion to the word 'to keep.'" Id. (citations ommitted).
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caring liquor. ,,52 The court held that "to keep," as stated in subdivision 3, must encompass more than a conscious possession because such activity is already stated as illegal by subdivision 2. Interpreting a knowledge requirement into subdivision 3 would
create a restatement of subdivision 2 and would violate the presumption that the legislature intends an entire statute to be effective. A The court also noted that if knowledge were necessary to sustain a conviction under the open bottle law, it would represent a
substantial obstacle. 55
The Minnesota Supreme Court noted that the legislature had
specifically stated the knowledge requirement in other traffic statutes.56 Therefore, if the legislature had meant to include a knowledge element into section 169.122 it could have added such language when the statute was amended. 5 In addition, other traffic
provisions use similar language and are interpreted as creating
strict liability offenses. Finally, the court acknowledged the idea
that while a person need not intend his act to be criminal, he must
intend to do the act that is criminal. 59 The court explained that in
this case, even though Loge may have been unaware of the bottle,
he intended to proceed forward in the truck. 6° Therefore, Loge assumed the responsibility of checking for the open bottle's presence
when he decided to drive the vehicle upon a public highway. 6

52. Id.
53. Id. at 158 (holding any other interpretation would render subdivision 3 as
mere surplusage) (citing MINN. STAT. § 645.17, subd. 2 (1998); State v. Orsello, 554
N.W.2d 70, 75-76 (Minn. 1996)).
54. Loge, 608 N.W.2d at 158.
55. Id. at 157.
56. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 152.027, subd. 3 (1998) where the word knowingly is used to modify the same language that is contained in subdivision 3 of section 169.122).
57. Id. Section 169.122 was amended in 1990, 1991, 1993, and 1994. MINN.
STAT. § 169.122.
58. Loge, 608 N.W.2d at 157 (citing MINN. STAT. § 169.14 (1998) (speeding)).
59. Id. at 158 (citing State v. Kremer, 114 N.W.2d 88, 89 (1962)).
60. Id. at 158. The Court cites to dicta in Kremer stating:
If the defendant.. .went through a stoplight that he did not, and was defending on the ground that he did so without any criminal intent, a court
could be justified in finding him guilty of a violation of the ordinance involved. When the driver intends to proceed forward, or is negligent in
any way, he can be held liable for his acts.
Id. (citing Kremer, 114 N.W.2d at 89).
61. Id.
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IV. THE ANALYSIS
The Minnesota Supreme Court properly interpreted Minnesota Statute section 169.122 when they held that subdivision 3 does
not require proof that a driver has knowledge of an open bottle.62
Specifically, the Appellate Court's analysis of the entire section
helped to illustrate the legislature's intent. 63 The distinction between subdivisions 2 and 3 shows the legislature's intent to hold the
owner or driver to a broader standard of strict liability versus holding a passenger liable only if they have possession of an open bottle. 4
The Supreme Court's position is further strengthened by the
statute's construction. Once again, the basis of such an interpretation is to ascertain the legislative intent. In this case, if the knowledge element were not removed from subdivision 3, it would simply
be a restatement of subdivision 2.65 Such a construction would violate the presumption that "the legislature intends the statute as a
whole to be effective and certain, with no surplusage."'66 In addition, the Minnesota Court of Appeals also notes that the other provisions in chapter 169 demonstrate intent. 67 Specifically, there are
several other provisions that seek to promote highway safety that do
not require knowledge by the driver.
Furthermore, the legislature has included an express knowledge 69requirement when it has intended to include such an element. For example, the legislature has included express language
62. Id. at 158-159 (construing MINN. STAT. § 169.122, subd. 3).
63. Loge, 589 N.W.2d at 493-94.
64. Id. at 493 (construing MINN. STAT. § 169.122, subd. 2 & 3 (1998 & Supp.
1999)). The Minnesota Court of Appeals accurately stated that:
[by] carving out a special rule for the owner and driver of a private motor
vehicle, rather than including them within the general prohibition in
subdivision 2, the legislature intended, in the exercise of the police
power for the protection of the public at large, to distinguish between
the liability of occupants, who do not have charge of the automobile, and
the liability of the owner and driver, who do.
Id.
65. Loge, 608 N.W.2d at 155; MINN. STAT. §169.122.
66. Loge, 608 N.W.2d at 155 (citing MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (1998); MINN. STAT.
§ 645.17, subd. 2 (1998)); State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 75-76 (Minn. 1996).
67. Loge, 589 N.W.2d at 494.
68. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 169.14 (1996) (forbidding drivers from exceeding
speed restrictions); MINN. STAT. § 169.34 (1996) (prohibiting drivers from parking
a vehicle in certain specified locations); MINN. STAT. § 169.48 (1996)(requiring
vehicles to display specific lighted lamps and illuminating devices).
69. Loge, 608 N.W.2d at 157.
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of knowledge in Minnesota Statute section 152.027. 7' The use of
the word "knowingly" was used to modify the word "keep," further
demonstrating that the legislature does not identify a conscious or
7
knowledge element into the word "keep" when used alone. 1 Simi-

larly, the legislature does not normally use the words "keep"
or "al72
low" to indicate the existence of a knowledge element.
The majority's opinion was also consistent with the Attorney
General's opinion.7 ' Approximately one year after the statute was
enacted, the Attorney General issued an opinion, in response to a
request of a local prosecutor, stating that a driver's knowledge of
an open bottle was not necessary to violate subdivision 3.74 This
75
opinion has remained unchanged for approximately forty years.
Such long-standing opinions are given careful consideration by the
courts.76 Similarly, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held:
[T]he fact that shortly after the Attorney General rendered an opinion stating that the provisions of § 192.39
were mandating, the legislature dealt with that section
and left it unchanged except for the amendment referred
to, strongly supports plaintiffs' position that the legislature intended to adopt the Attorney General's interpretation of the statute."77
Section 169.122 had been amended five times between the
time of the Attorney General's opinion and the appellate court's

70. MINN. STAT. § 152.027, subd. 3 (1998 & Supp. 1999) (stating that a driver
is guilty of a misdemeanor if he "knowingly keeps or allows to be kept" marijuana
in a motor vehicle); see also MINN. STAT. § 609.321, subd. 7, subp. 3 (1996) (stating
that someone who knowingly keeps a place of prostitution promotes prostitution).
71. Id.; Loge, 608N.W.2dat157.
72. Loge, 589 N.W.2d at 493; see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subd. 9, subp. 1
(1996) (stating that "when criminal intent is an element of a crime in this chapter,
such intent is indicated by the term 'intentionally,' the phrase 'with intent to,' or
some form of the verbs 'know' or 'believe.'").
73. Jan.-Mar. 1960 Minn. Op. Att'y Gen. 989a-25 (Jan. 5, 1960).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Billigmeier v. County of Hennepin, 428 N.W.2d 79, 82 (Minn. 1988); see
also Loge, 608 N.W.2d at 157; Village of Blaine v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 12, Anoka
County, 138 N.W.2d 32, 39 (Minn. 1965) (stating careful consideration should be
given to an Attorney General's opinion regarding a school district's action to contract for the construction of a gas line); Country of Poland v. Wegrzyn, 517 N.W.2d
81, 84 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (acknowledging an Attorney General's opinion upholding the existence of reciprocal actions between the United States and Poland).
77. Stoecker v. Moeglein, 129 N.W.2d 793, 796 (Minn. 1964).
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holding in the Loge case. 78 The fact that the legislature never took
the opportunity to add an express knowledge requirement into
subdivision 3 lends credence to their acceptance of the Attorney
General's opinion. 9 Similarly, the statute was again amended in
2000, after the appellate court's decision in Loge.s° Therefore, if
the legislature had disagreed with the appellate court's decision in
Loge, it could have overridden the judicial decision by including an
express knowledge requirement in subdivision 3.
In determining the legislative intent behind section 169.122,
the dissenting judges seem to get hung-up on minor variations of
definitions.8 ' Specifically, the dissenting opinion focuses on the
number of different definitions of the word "keep."82 This causes
the dissenting judges to lose sight of the public policy that guides
the enactment of Open Bottle Laws. The intent of the Open Bottle
Law is to promote highway safety by decreasing the opportunity for
drunken driving,s3 not to protect drivers who have failed to inspect
a vehicle before driving on a public highway. As the Minnesota
Court of Appeals noted, "[t]he burden subdivision 3 imposes on
the owner and the driver of an automobile is minimal compared to
the mischief the legislature intended8 4 to prevent, namely, drinking
intoxicated beverages while driving."
The great social harm that the imposition of strict liability
would seek to protect would outweigh any burden that such a policy would impose.8 5 Specifically, in 1998, 15,935 people died from
alcohol-related accidents in the United States. 816 That same year,
38.4 percent of fatal accidents were attributed to alcohol." Alcohol
78.
79.

MINN. STAT. § 169.122 (1998 & Supp. 1999).
State v. Loge, 608 N.W.2d 152, 157 (Minn. 2000).

80.

MINN. STAT. § 169.122.

81. Loge, 608 N.W.2d at 154, 160 (Anderson,J. dissenting). The majority and
dissenting opinions are at odds over whether the words "keep" and "allow" imply
some degree of conscious effort or knowledge as used in section 169.122. Id.
82. Id. at 160.
83. Loge, 589 N.W.2d at 494.
84. Id.
85. Id.; see also United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 (1922) (stating that
"Congress weighed the possible injustice of subjecting an innocent seller to a penalty against the evil of exposing innocent purchasers to danger from the drug, and
concluded that the latter was the result preferably to be avoided.").
86. Patrick J. Stapleton, Editorial, Off-Target: Focus Crackdown on Heavy Drinkers, Repeat Offenders to Reduce DUI Deaths, THE HARRISBURG PATRIOT, Mar. 24, 2000,
atA18. 1998 was the last year of available statistics on alcohol-related deaths. Id.
87. Id.; see also Stephen Fuzesi, Drunk DrivingArrests DroppingSafety: Study shows
that stiffer penalties and societal changes are having effect nationwide, Los ANGELES
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has been identified as the "single most important factor yet identified in traffic fatalities.""" Alcohol-related traffic injuries are a persistent problem that has existed for a long period of time. 9 Therefore, the affirmative duty placed on an owner or driver of a motor
vehicle to check for open containers is an acceptable burden in
light of "the substantial physical, emotional, and monetary damage
TIMES, June 14, 1999, at A6 (stating that as drunk-driving arrests dropped from

1986 to 1997, the number of people behind bars or on probation for driving while
intoxicated increased by ninety percent, an indication that drunk drivers are receiving tougher sentences).
88. NICHOLS, supra note 6, at 1 (citation omitted). For Americans between
the ages of six and twenty-seven, car accidents are the leading cause of death.
LEviTT & PORTER, supra note 6, at 1. In over forty percent of fatal crashes, one of

the drivers has been found to have alcohol in their system. Id. Between I a.m.
and 3 a.m. (when an estimated twenty-five percent of drivers are estimated to have
been drinking), the percentage of drinking drivers who are involved in fatal
crashed rises to sixty percent. Id. at 1, 4.
89. NICHOLS, supra note 6, at 1. The author quotes an editorial from 1904
that states the following:
We have received a communication containing the history of 25 fatal accidents occurring to automobile wagons, 15 persons occupying these
wagons were killed outright, 5 more died 2 days later, and 3 other persons were killed. 14 persons were injured, some of them seriously. A
careful inquiry showed that in 19 of these accidents drivers had used spirits within an hour or more of the disaster. The other 6 drivers were all
moderate drinkers, but it was not ascertained whether they had used spirits preceding the accident. The author of this communication shows very
clearly that the management of automobile wagons is far more dangerous for men who drink than the driving of locomotives on steel rails.
Inebriates and moderate drinkers are the most incapable of all persons to
drive motor wagons. The general palsy and diminished power of control
of both the reason and senses are certain to invite disaster in every attempt to guide such wagons. The precaution of railroad companies to
have only total abstainers guide their engines will soon extend to the
owners and drivers of these new motor wagons. The following incident
illustrates this new danger: A recent race between the owners of large
wagons, in which a number of gentlemen took part, was suddenly terminated by one of the owners and drivers, who persisted in using spirits.
His friends deserted him, and in returning to his home his wagon ran off
a bridge and was wrecked. With the increased popularity of these wagons, accidents of this kind will rapidly multiply, and we invite our readers
to make notes of disasters of this kind.
Id. at 1-2 n.3 (citation omitted). Individuals driving under the influence of alcohol
have a much higher chance of being involved in a serious accident. Id. at 2. The
author explains that of the drivers with a blood alcohol concentrations at or above
0.10 (one to four percent of all drivers on the road) cause 50-55% of all fatal single-vehicle crashes. Id. In Minnesota, forty-six percent of fatal two-vehicle crashes
involve a driver with a positive blood alcohol reading. Id. Similarly, "a full 61% of
drivers killed during typical drinking hours-from 9:00 P.M. through 6:00 A.M.have blood alcohol concentrations of 0.10 or more." Id.
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caused by drunk driving."90
In relation to the policy analysis, the dissenting judges fail to
see the problems that proof of knowledge would create.9' If the
element of knowledge were required for a conviction under subdivision 3, evasion would seriously limit the applicability of the statute.92 Specifically, a driver could deny knowledge of the open bottle and avoid conviction and, in the process, defray the policy
objectives behind the statute. The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly stated that inclusion of an element of knowledge would present "a substantial, if not insurmountable, difficulty of proof. 9"
Many of the dissenting judges' arguments become irrelevant
due to the fact that the majority made only a limited interpretation
of section 169.122. 94 The court interpreted the statute under the
facts presented.a Specifically, the majority's decision
only
dealt
•
•
96
with a situation where there was a sole occupant in the vehicle. In
addition, this scenario allowed the court to produce a holding that
dealt with only one of the two disjunctive alternatives in subdivision
3.97 Therefore, the court only ruled on whether knowledge was
implied by the words "to keep" in the statute. 9s In light of this distinction, much of the dissent's analysis regarding situations with
more than one individual in the vehicle become baseless.
Additionally, many of the dissenting judges' other arguments
seem implausible. Specifically, the dissent argues that a driver with
no knowledge of an open bottle should not be held liable because
he or she does not intend to do the act that constitutes the crime.9
90. Nielsen, supra note 7, at 121. The author further illustrates by explaining
that, in 1994 alone, 17,000 people were killed, 1,000,000 people were injured and
billions of dollars were spent on health, medical, and economic costs due to drunk
driving. Id. "In 1994, the United States spent $6 billion in medical expenses, $25
billion in lost wages and $79 billion as a result of the pain and suffering endured
by individuals, a total of over $110 billion." Id. Drunk drivers also cause an estimated $5 billion in property damages each year. Id. at 122.
91. State v. Loge, 608 N.W.2d 152, 159 (Minn. 2000).
92. Id. at 157 (discussing MINN. STAT. §169.122 (1998 & Supp. 1999)).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 155.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 156.
97. Loge, 608 N.W.2d at 155; MINN. STAT. § 169.122, subd. 3 (establishing
liability if a driver "keeps" any open bottle containing intoxicating liquor within
the areas normally occupied by the driver and passengers or, in the alternative,
"allows" to be kept any bottle containing intoxicating liquor within the areas normally occupied by the driver and passengers).
98. Loge, 608 N.W.2d at 155.
99. Id. at 159.
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The dissent neglects to realize that the point behind the statute is
to prevent alcohol from being accessible to individuals within a vehicle.'0 0 The driver, as operator of the vehicle, is in the best position to discover open containers and, therefore, should have an affirmative duty to make sure that there are no open bottles in
violation of section 169.122. 1 In general, the driver intends to
drive the vehicle on public highways and, therefore, must do so in
accordance with applicable laws.
Finally, the dissent notes that under the Minnesota Jury Instructions the trial judge may include the knowledge element in
the instruction according to his or her interpretation of section
169.122.102 However, the comment states that such a discretionary
decision is allowed because the appellate courts have not ruled on
the question of proof of knowledge.' 3 In this case, the Appellate
Court has decided the question 10 4 and, therefore, the argument becomes irrelevant.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Loge decision correctly affirmed the Minnesota Court of
Appeals' interpretation of Minnesota Statute section 169.122 as
creating a strict liability offense for
an owner or driver of a vehicle
• 105
who violates the Open Bottle law.
The limited opinion of the
Minnesota Supreme Court, with regard to a sole individual in the
vehicle, was consistent with the Attorney General's opinion issued
forty years ago. °6 Such an interpretation was also in line with the
legislative intent when analyzed with regard to similar statutory
construction.
Additionally, the legislature indirectly gave its approval by amending the statute. -108
in the spring of 2000 and keeping
the debated language unaltered.
Finally, such a decision supports the important public policy behind the statute. In other
words, the Supreme Court's affirmation of the court of appeals'
COSTELLO, supra note 5, at 221.
101. Loge, 608 N.W.2d at 158.
102. Id. at 161-62; see also 10a Minn. Dist. Judges Ass'n, Minnesota Practice-Jury
Instruction Guides, Misdemeanor and Gross Misdemeanor, M-JIG 3.17 Comment (1989
ed.).
103. Loge, 608 N.W.2d at 161-62.
104. State v. Loge, 589 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
105. Loge, 608 N.W.2d at 153.
106. Jan.-Mar. 1960 Minn. Op. Att'y Gen. 989a-25 (Jan. 5, 1960).
107. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 169.14, § 169.34, § 169.48.
108. MINN. STAT. § 169.122 (2000).
100.
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decision helps expand liability for the deadly combination of drinking and driving.
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